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Abstract
Background: Despite common recognition of joint responsibility for global health by all countries particularly
to ensure justice in global health, current discussions of countries’ obligations for global health largely ignore
obligations of developing countries. This is especially the case with regards to obligations relating to health
financing. Bearing in mind that it is not possible to achieve justice in global health without achieving equity in
health financing at both domestic and global levels, our aim is to show how fulfilling the obligation we propose
will make it easy to achieve equity in health financing at both domestic and international levels.
Discussion: Achieving equity in global health financing is a crucial step towards achieving justice in global health.
Our general view is that current discussions on global health equity largely ignore obligations of Low Income
Country (LIC) governments and we recommend that these obligations should be mainstreamed in current
discussions. While we recognise that various obligations need to be fulfilled in order to ultimately achieve justice in
global health, for lack of space we prioritise obligations for health financing. Basing on the evidence that in most
LICs health is not given priority in annual budget allocations, we propose that LIC governments should bear an
obligation to allocate a certain minimum percent of their annual domestic budget resources to health, while they
await external resources to supplement domestic ones. We recommend and demonstrate a mechanism for
coordinating this obligation so that if the resulting obligations are fulfilled by both LIC and HIC governments it will
be easy to achieve equity in global health financing.
Summary: Although achieving justice in global health will depend on fulfilment of different categories of
obligations, ensuring inter- and intra-country equity in health financing is pivotal. This can be achieved by requiring
all LIC governments to allocate a certain optimal per cent of their domestic budget resources to health while
they await external resources to top up in order to cover the whole cost of the minimum health
opportunities for LIC citizens.
Background
The Alma Ata Declaration (1978) categorically stated
that “the existing gross inequality in the health status
of the people particularly between developed and
developing countries as well as within countries is
politically, socially and economically unacceptable and
is, therefore, of common concern to all countries”
(emphasis added) [1]. Following this declaration there
has been wide recognition of shared responsibilities
for global health implying that all countries – High
Income Countries (HICs), Middle Income Countries
(MICs) as well as LICs – have a joint responsibility
for improving global health with equity as one of the
overarching goals. However, currently the actual pro-
posals regarding obligations of countries to contribute
to efforts towards global health equity largely ignore
specific obligations of LIC governments, particularly obli-
gations relating to health financing.1 The negligible atten-
tion given to LIC governments’ obligations is evident in a
number of global initiatives aiming at improving health op-
portunities of citizens in poor countries. Some of these ini-
tiatives include the proposed Framework Convention on
global health [2]; the Global plan to combat neglected
tropical diseases [3]; and the Global strategy and plan of
action on public health, innovation and intellectual prop-
erty [4]. Further, the findings and recommendations of the
Commission on intellectual property rights, innovation
and public health [5]; the Report of the consultative expert* Correspondence: Reidar.lie@uib.no
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working group on Research and Development: Financing
and Coordination [6] among others are all concerned with
international health resource transfer from HICs to LICs.
So far it seems to be taken for granted that LIC govern-
ments are doing everything possible within their limited re-
source contexts to fulfill the health needs of their citizens.
But whereas it is necessary to mobilize external resources
to fill the health-resource-gaps in LICs, a lot of evidence
has suggested that there is need to think about possible ob-
ligations of LICs themselves in health financing [7–13]. All
these authors point at various weaknesses in health finan-
cing within LICs which cause health inequities within those
countries. It is also important to note that these domestic
inequities are usually reproduced in the general global
health picture whenever international health comparisons
are made. With very good reasons all the above authors
strongly imply that most LIC governments behave as if
they are unwilling rather than unable to equitably fulfil the
health needs (or rights) of their citizens through, among
other things, equitable health financing. Drawing from
these views our argument is that these weaknesses in
health financing within LICs can be significantly reduced if
LIC governments fulfill certain obligations relating to
health financing. We argue and recommend that LICs
should bear an obligation to allocate a certain minimum
percentage of their domestic resources to health, while ex-
ternal resources should be used to top up whatever short-
fall remains in order to achieve a certain minimum level of
health opportunities for all individuals. For the purpose of
implementing the obligation we are proposing we will rec-
ommend a specific mechanism for reducing intra-country
inequities and show that this will at the same time reduce
inequities in inter-country health financing.
After some conceptual clarifications we begin by provid-
ing evidence of low priority given to health sectors in
LICs’ budget allocations, and we later use this evidence as
a basis for defending the view that in the pursuit of global
health equity LIC governments should fulfill the obligation
we are proposing. We then begin our main discussion by
stating and explaining the obligation of LICs which we are
advocating. We go ahead to recommend a mechanism
which helps to reveal, understand and mitigate the exist-
ing inequities in health financing between and within LICs
as well as between all countries rich and poor. We demon-
strate the effectiveness of this mechanism in determining
LIC and HIC governments’ fair and optimal financial obli-
gations for health financing and go ahead to show how
fulfilling the resulting obligations by each country will lead
to equity in global health financing as one of the steps to-
wards global health justice.
Underlying concepts
In this paper we shall understand health inequity in gen-
eral as undeserved inequalities in health status or access
to health services which can be reduced by human
efforts. By global health inequity we mean health in-
equity among individuals irrespective of national bor-
ders, or health inequities between and within countries.
Equity in global health financing will be understood here
as an inter- and intra-country proportionate distribution
of the financing burden for a certain minimum level of
health opportunities for all individuals globally by taking
into account differences in resource capacities of differ-
ent countries. By Global Minimum Health Expenditure
(GMHE) per capita we mean the average cost of finan-
cing an ‘Essential Health Package’ per person per year in
each country, or as we call it, ‘a certain minimum level
of health opportunities per capita’. Our concept of the
“minimum” follows from the WHO concept of an
‘Essential Health Package’ which is supposed to be a
guaranteed minimum of “a limited list of public and
clinical interventions which will be provided at primary
and/or secondary level care” for citizens of LICs (em-
phasis in original) [14]. Other ideas which point to the
concept of the “minimum” include “Universal Coverage”
for all people which “does not necessarily mean coverage
for everything …” [15]; the ‘progressive realization of the
right to health’; ‘Essential Medicines/Drugs’ among
others. All these concepts imply that there is a certain
minimum of health opportunities that should be seen as
a right of every individual globally as recommended by
the Alma Ata Declaration’s concept of Primary Heath
Care [16]. The reasoning in our discussion reflects a
view that if individuals are not assisted to realise this
moral right yet it is within the means of obligation
bearers (both HIC and LIC governments), then such ob-
ligation bearers are acting unjustly. Since we propose
that the cost of covering this minimum be shared equit-
ably between HICs and LICs (taking into account the
resource capacity of each of them) then if such a mini-
mum is not covered, then it will be possible to identify
the source of injustice by looking at which actor(s)
refused to fulfill their quota of obligation. But most
importantly our concern in this paper is that the
minimum health opportunities should be fully and
equitably financed by public resources from both LICs
and HICs without any private health expenditure
(PHE). Therefore, in our discussion Global Health
Justice is, or consists in, guaranteeing a certain mini-
mum level of health opportunities to all individuals
globally and ensuring an inter- and intra-country
equitable sharing of the burden to that effect.
Evidence of low priority given to health sectors in LIC
budgets
There are suggestions that LIC governments allocate a
lesser percentage of their annual domestically generated
budget resources to health than they should, and could
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afford. For instance, considering the World Health
Organisation (WHO) Africa Region, Africa’s annual
average budget allocation to health as a percentage of
total government budgets is 8.7 % compared with
Europe’s 14.8 % and the Americas’ 16.8 % [17]. By the
year 2001 the African Heads of States and Governments
of African Union member states had realised that they
were allocating negligible percentages of their budgets to
health amidst increasing amounts of resources needed to
respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, Tuberculosis and
other communicable diseases. Having realised these fi-
nancing gaps in the health sectors across Africa due to
low priority given to health budgets, they all committed
themselves to allocating at least 15 % of their annual
budgets to health in what they called the Abuja Declar-
ation on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related
Infectious Diseases [18]. However, since 2001 few African
countries have reached this target; and currently the
trend is regressing. For example, the WHO revealed
that “19 of the countries in the region who signed
the declaration allocate less now than they did in
2001” [19]. Only four countries (Rwanda, Botswana,
Zambia and Togo) fulfilled their commitment to the
Abuja declaration’s 15 % [20].
In reaction to this relapsing trend, there is a view that
Africa needs to improve on the laudable Abuja commit-
ment and progress from “just 15 % to ‘15 % plus” by
doubling per capita investment in health, and also more
in crucial social determinants and pillars of health [21].
Further, the WHO has recommended that increased pri-
ority should be given to health from the general budget
and/or debt relief funds. From the analysis undertaken
for the World Health Report of 2011, “it is clear that
some countries need to increase their own investments
in health either through reallocation within their own
general budgets or by making larger claims on their
funds from debt relief which are to be preferentially allo-
cated to social spending” [22]. For example, in Uganda it
has been observed that the health sector is unnecessarily
neglected and as a consequence the Uganda health sec-
tor has been found to be in a very sorry state, unneces-
sarily [23–25]. But despite repeated pleas with the
government to increase resources to the health sector,
“the government has continuously shown unwillingness
to make the health sector its priority in budget alloca-
tions” [26].
This alleged avoidable lack of sufficient funding for
health within developing countries by the LICs themselves
is the background for our argument that in addition to
discussing obligations of HIC governments to, among
other things, transfer health resources to LMICs,
complementary obligations of the latter should also
be emphasised. This is because from the point of view of
fairness – as it has been argued in the case of human
rights obligations – “a sound case for transnational obliga-
tions cannot be made, intellectually or politically” [and in
this case morally], without eventually defining the scope
and limits of national obligations” [27]. But most import-
antly as our view is that it will remain extremely difficult
to achieve justice in global health unless obligations of
LICs are identified and implemented.
Discussion
LICs’ minimum financial obligation for health
The obligation of LIC governments we are arguing for is
that all LICs should allocate a certain uniform minimum
percentage of their domestic budget resources to their
health sectors as their contribution to cover part of the
cost of the minimum health opportunities for each of
their citizens. In this paper we do not intend to recom-
mend the actual percentage of domestic budgets which
all LICs should allocate to their health sectors. This is
because such a recommendation will have to be
evidence-based taking into account the resource capaci-
ties of different countries and other relevant factors, all
of which are beyond the means and resources of this
paper. However, we will use a hypothetical percentage
and then proceed to recommend and demonstrate a
mechanism for dividing proportionately between HIC
and LIC governments, the total cost (financing burden)
of meeting these minimum health opportunities and this
mechanism takes as its point of departure the optimal
size of LIC governments’ obligation.
In order to get to the root of the obligation we are
proposing for LIC governments and how it will ensure
equity in global health financing, we will take as our
point of departure the estimate provided by the WHO of
the cost of resources needed to provide basic life-saving
services (health opportunities) per person per year in de-
veloping countries which is US$ 44 per person per year
[28]. The obligations of LIC governments and external
governments should be specified in terms of percentages
of this cost, beginning with an optimal size of LIC gov-
ernments’ obligations. This implies that all countries
which need external health resources in order to achieve
the targeted minimum of health opportunities (expressed
as GMHE per capita) should allocate a certain specific op-
timal percentage of their domestically generated annual
budget resources to their health sectors in order to fulfill
their quota of health financing obligation. Basing on the
deficits that will remain after fulfilling this (LIC) obligation
it will make it easy to determine the exact size of the obli-
gations of external governments.
For its effectiveness, this obligation presumes and recom-
mends coordination in global health financing especially in
international health resource transfers. Coordination is
crucial because it has been observed that uncoordinated
health financing between countries has no capacity to
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achieve global health equity and at the same time it has a
high potential of deepening the existing inequities [29].
However, coordination in financing global health partly re-
quires a mechanism for determining international obliga-
tions owed to each country, particularly those in need of
external resources to cover the minimum health opportun-
ities per capita. But again as a point of emphasis, in order
to determine the needed resources from HICs to LICs it is
important first of all to determine an optimal level of
health financing that can be reasonably expected from
LICs by virtue of their resource capacities. It is this level
that should constitute their (LICs) obligation, while the
deficit that remains constitutes the size of external obliga-
tions. Fulfilling these obligations will lead, at least in
principle, to inter- and intra-country equity in financing
the global minimum of health opportunities that should be
guaranteed to all individuals globally as a matter of right.
For the purpose of implementing this obligation we recom-
mend and illustrate a mechanism proposed by Ooms and
Hammonds [30] for determining the size of HIC obliga-
tions in fulfilling the right to health for citizens in LMICs.
We will later illustrate how fulfilling the resulting obliga-
tions leads to equity in financing global health.
A mechanism for achieving equitable burden-sharing in
global health financing
The point of departure for Ooms and Hammonds is a
challenge set by Norman Daniels in his book Just Health
[31]. After defending the ethical appropriateness of
shared responsibilities for health at a national level,
Daniels expresses pessimism at the possibility of extend-
ing the ethical principles he used to a global level [30]
and sets this as challenge for those interested in global
health justice. In Taking up Daniels’ Challenge, Ooms
and Hammonds propose a mechanism for determining
the amount of financial resources HICs should transfer
to LMICs in order to realise the right to health.2 It
should be noted that whereas Ooms and Hammonds’
emphasis is on HIC obligations to ensure the fulfilment
of the right to health in LMICs, our emphasis is on the
obligations of LICs themselves in ensuring global health
justice, particularly equity in global health financing.
Their mechanism implies that determining a reasonable
size of financial obligations of LIC governments entails
that what remains is a fair size of HIC obligation. Hence,
whereas Ooms and Hammonds use this mechanism in
their argument for, and illustration of how to determine
HIC obligations to ensure the right to health, we will adopt
this mechanism in our argument for, and illustration of,
how determining and implementing LIC obligations will
ensure equity in global health financing.
Ooms and Hammonds show that given that the
amount of resources needed for each individual to en-
sure a just level of health [opportunities] is known, if all
LICs allocated a certain minimum percentage of their
GDP to health, it would be easy to determine the deficit
for each individual in that country in order to reach the
targeted minimum of such health opportunities in form
of GMHE per capita’. In turn the total of these individ-
ual deficits would constitute the size of international
health assistance owed to each poor country. Their
hypothetical illustration is summarised as follows:
If [poor] Country A has a GDP per capita of about
US$333 and commits 3 % of this amount, or US$10
per person per year on the distribution of health
related goods, then the global obligation towards
country A is limited to ensuring that it can achieve
health-related goods distribution worth US$40 per
person per year, assuming that this financing level
[US$40] is what it takes to realize the core content of
the right to health. Hence the international obligation
to such a country would be an equivalent of US$30
per person per year. And if Country B has a GDP per
capita of US$1,000, and commits 3 % of that amount
(or US$30 per person per year) on health-related
goods, the global responsibility towards B would be the
equivalent of US$ 10 per person per year. Then, if
Country C has a GDP per capita of US$2,000, and
allocates 3 % of that amount (or US$60 per person per
year) on the distribution of Health-related goods, then
there would be no global responsibility towards C [30].
This mechanism implies that once the obligations of
LICs we are proposing are fulfilled, the size of each LIC’s
claim on international health resources will be directly
proportional to its level of poverty. That is to say, poorer
countries will be morally entitled to more health-aid per
capita compared to countries which are better-off (such
as MICs). This will ensure proportionate sharing of the
burden of financing the targeted level of health oppor-
tunities for all individuals globally. It will mean that this
minimum level of health opportunities is 100 % publicly
financed from contributions of domestic governments
and external governments. At this point there will be no
financial barriers to such minimum health opportunities
at the point of service delivery as well as financial in-
equities between individuals which normally arise from
private health expenditures and more especially Out of
Pocket Payment (OPP).
Generally, what Ooms and Hammonds have done is to
show that it is possible to provide a reasonable way of
specifying and coordinating international obligations to
provide health aid. Below we show how, basing on our
proposed obligation, this framework can be used to
identify lack of equity in health financing between LICs
themselves and between HICs and LICs in their effort to
meet the health needs of LIC citizens.
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Some preliminary points
First, whereas Ooms and Hammonds use the percentage
of GDP in illustrating the mechanism for determining
the size of HIC obligations, in our illustrations we will
use the percentage of domestically generated annual
budget resources. This is because the percentage of GDP
devoted to health is much broader. GDP does not usu-
ally indicate the actual public resources available for
health spending in a given financial year, and it also in-
cludes private contributions (PHE) which we seek to
avoid in financing the targeted minimum of health
opportunities. Therefore, since our concern is with the
actual amount of public resources that can be made
available from a certain percentage of the budget,
instead of using ‘GDP per capita’ we will use ‘domestic
annual budget per capita’. We will exemplify our illus-
trations by considering health financing in two countries
from the WHO Africa region – Uganda and Kenya. In
subsequent examples we will use a few more countries
in the same region that receive external health resources.
Secondly, whereas the WHO estimates the average cost
of basic life-saving services per person per year at
US$44, the actual cost in different countries will obvi-
ously vary depending on the specific needs of each coun-
try, local costs of services among others. This means
that in some countries the actual cost will be less than,
and in some others above, US$44. In our illustrations we
use a higher hypothetical figure of US$60 in order to ac-
count for these variabilities and the potential need for
the minimum health opportunities to go beyond simply
life-saving services. But whatever the actual cost per
country may turn out to be, it should depend on evi-
dence from country-specific studies. And in order to
ease our illustrations we shall use a uniform cost of the
minimum services (US$60) in all our examples since this
does not affect the validity of the obligation we are pro-
posing and the mechanism we are recommending.
Current inequities in health financing between countries
Table 1 demonstrates the current inequity in health
financing between Uganda and Kenya as a result of the
different percentages of their domestically generated
annual budget resources allocated to health.
Table 1 shows that Kenya’s Total Budget per capita for
2009/10 (excluding aid) was around US$226 and only
5.4 % of it was allocated to health, generating US$12.20
per person. In the case of Uganda the domestic budget
was around US$152 per person, and 7.4 % of this was
allocated to health leading to US$11.20 per person. This
means that if we assume the average cost of the mini-
mum health opportunities to be US$60 in both coun-
tries, it means that in order to reach this target Kenya
will need extra US$47.80, while Uganda’s deficit will be
US$48.80. But since Kenya is wealthier (higher GDP/
budget per capita) than Uganda, Kenya can allocate to
health a smaller percentage of its budget than Uganda to
reach the same absolute per capita contribution or even
higher as Table 1 shows. This implies that these two
countries are carrying disproportionate burdens in finan-
cing the global minimum health opportunities. This is
an example of inter-LIC inequity in global health
financing.
Hence, in order to equalise the financing burden
between the two countries there is need to specify an
optimal percentage of domestic budget resources which
all LICs should allocate to their health sectors and then
proceed to calculate the shortfall for each of them
needed from external health resources. This will ensure
that each country’s size of claim on external resources is
proportionate to its level of poverty and in relation to
claims of other health-aid seekers. For example, if LIC
financing obligation was to be set at Kenya’s 5.4 % (in
Table 1) the whole of the current shortfalls for both
countries (and even more) would become a HIC obliga-
tion. If it were set at Uganda’s 7.4 %, Uganda would re-
ceive the whole of her current shortfall from external
resources, while Kenya would be entitled to less than it
could claim if the minimum were set at 5.4 %. Yet, if the
Abuja Declaration’s target of 15 % referred to earlier
were to be accepted as an optimal financial obligation
for LIC governments, then the resulting lower deficits to
reach the GMHE per capita would entail that both coun-
tries would have to contribute additional resources to
cover part of their current shortfalls, but Kenya would
have to contribute proportionally more compared to
Uganda given her higher GDP. In other words, by equal-
ising these countries’ burden of health financing, their
Table 1 Inequitable health financing due to unequal budget allocations to health between Uganda and Kenya
Country Total domestic budget
per capita (US$)
Health expenditure as % of





Deficit to reach GMHE
per capita (US$)
Uganda 152 7.4 11.25 60 48.75
Kenya 226 5.4 12.20 60 47.80
Source: Constructed on the basis of figures from Uganda’s Health Sector Performance Report, 2012/13 and Kenya National Health Accounts 2009/10
Total Budget Per Capita has been calculated using Actual Health Expenditure (from public domestic resources) for each country as a percentage of total domestic
budgets (without external funds)
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current relative claims on international resources change
in favour of Uganda which currently bears a dispropor-
tionate burden in relation to Kenya. The moral essence
of this point is that since justice requires proportionate
distribution of burdens/costs, this change in relative
claims which is in favour of Uganda is morally justified
and necessary.
Earlier we mentioned that there is a widely shared
view that most LIC governments allocate negligible per-
centages of their annual domestic budgets to health.
Therefore, if this is true, then it implies that if the whole
of LICs’ current shortfalls is demanded from HICs, there
will be disproportionate burden sharing between LICs
and HICs because LICs are imposing part of their obli-
gation onto HICs. Hence in our next illustration we shall
use a higher percentage which was recommended by the
African Heads of States and governments. In the view of
the African Heads of States and Governments as
expressed in the Abuja Declaration of 2001, arguably,
African countries have the capacity to allocate at least
15 % of their annual budgets to improving health. So, for
the purpose of this illustration we will assume 15 % of
domestically generated annual budget resources as the
optimal financial obligation for LIC governments. We will
use it to demonstrate how fulfilling our proposed LIC gov-
ernment obligation leads to inter-LIC equity in global
health financing 3 and equity between HICs and LICs.
However, there are a few important points to note about
the Abuja target of 15 %. First, the Abuja Declaration does
not specify whether 15 % is of the total government
budget including external resources, or if it is a percentage
of domestically generated resources only. Secondly, in the
Declaration there is no independent justification of 15 %
from the point of view of resource capacities of countries.
Failure to take into count resource capacity might explain
why most African countries have not lived up to their
commitments, hence suggesting the need for an evidence-
based financing target. But despite all these issues, for the
limited purpose of our illustration we shall take this 15 %
as a percent of domestically generated budget resources
agreed upon by all actors.
Table 2 shows how much health aid would need to be
contributed by international donors if one sets a uniform
obligatory level (obligation) of health financing for LIC
governments as percentage of their domestic annual
budget at 15 %. For the two countries considered earlier
(Uganda and Kenya) for example, their deficits will fall.
In the case of Uganda it will decline from US$48.8 (in
Table 1) to US$37.2 (Table 2); while for Kenya it will
reduce from US$47.80 (Table 1) to US$26.1 (Table 2).
This shows that the two countries would increase their re-
spective domestic contributions by different absolute
amounts as a result of increasing their budget percentages
to health. Kenya would contribute an additional 21.7 US$
(US$ 33.9 – 12.2) and Uganda 11.6 US$ (US$ 22.8 – 11.2).
The impact of this obligation on justice is that by doing
their best in health financing, LICs will reduce the burden
of health financing currently borne (or expected to be
borne) by HIC citizens. In other words, on top of all LICs
bearing an equal burden of financing the minimum health
opportunities per capita, the resulting deficits will be a fair
size of obligation for HICs since LICs will have reached a
level where they are unable, rather than unwilling, to allo-
cate more resources to health.
Further, given that LIC governments need to increase
their domestic contribution to health [15], it will be pos-
sible to save external resources that are now going to
countries (LMICs) 4 that have the capacity to afford the
global minimum of health opportunities per capita with-
out international resources if such countries fulfilled
their 15 % or whatever the size is of this minimum obli-
gation will turn out to be. Such countries would be, for
example, Equatorial Guinea and Namibia in Table 2,
since they would have “No Deficit”. With the possibility
of coordinated global health financing, especially exter-
nal health financing to cover the GMHE per capita, it
would be possible to redirect some of the external re-
sources currently going to countries like Equatorial
Table 2 The effect of standardising financing obligation at Abuja’s 15 % on inter-country financing equity
Country Total budget
per capita (US$)
Current domestic % of budget
and resulting absolute per capita
US$ (X% = US$)
Absolute US$ from 15 % of
domestic resources per country
GMHE per
capita (US$)
Deficit (US$) per capita
to reach GMHE (US$ 60)
Uganda 152 7.4 % = 11.2 22.8 60 37.2
Kenya 226 5.4 % = 12.2 33.9 60 26.1
Rwanda 130 23.3 % = 30 19.5 60 40.5
Equatorial Guinea 6943 7.0 % = 486 1041 60 No Deficit
Tanzania 126 11.1 % =14 18.9 60 41.1
Namibia 2400 6.5 % = 156 360 60 No Deficit
Source: Constructed from National Health Expenditure Statistics for Uganda and Kenya (Table 1); and Estimates for the rest of the countries’ Annual domestic
budget per capita has been calculated basing on the 2010 Health Expenditure Per Capita as percentage of Annual health budget (without foreign resources)
Provided by Afri-Dev. Info. 2013. (Post Abuja + 12) 2013 Africa Health Financing Scorecard – Featuring Year 2000–2010 Indicative Progress Summary
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Guinea and Namibia to countries which, even after allo-
cating 15 % or more of their domestic budgets to health,
such as Rwanda, cannot raise the needed GMHE per
capita estimated at US$60. The underlying moral rea-
soning here is that it is unjust to give assistance to coun-
tries which are, or can be, above the targeted threshold
of health-opportunities without assistance before suffi-
cient assistance is given to others which have not yet
reached, and cannot reach, the same threshold without
extra assistance by virtue of their more constrained re-
source capacities. In other words among LMICs there
are some countries which are capable of fully financing
the minimum health opportunities for their citizens
without external assistance yet such countries are cur-
rently receiving health aid before poorer ones get what
they need. Our view is that when such countries claim
external resources before worse-off countries get enough
to cover their minimum health opportunities, then such
claims (by better-off countries) are unjust. So far this
category of moral reasoning is evidently lacking in the
current manner in which global health is financed, par-
ticularly international health resource transfers. This
poses a serious threat to the efforts and hope of achiev-
ing global health equity.
Presently, if we go by actual health financing statistics
among WHO African region Member States, in 2010
Equatorial Guinea and Namibia allocated only 7 and
6.5 % respectively of their annual domestic budgets’ re-
sources to health and they were able to raise as high as
US$486 and US$156 per person respectively; yet at the
same time, between 2000 and 2010 Equatorial Guinea
received a cumulative total of US$30.50 million from the
Global Fund alone; while Namibia received US$187.72
million [20]. Hence, from the point of view of what con-
stitutes just or unjust claims on external resources as de-
scribed above, the amount of Global Fund resources
claimed and received by Namibia and Equatorial Guinea
constituted unjust claims on international health re-
sources. This is especially the case because there are
some economically worse-off countries which could not
raise the GMHE per capita even if they allocated as high
as 23 % of their annual budgets to health (Rwanda); and
also the amount of health aid they received could not
enable them reach the GMHE per capita of US$60.
Therefore, since equitable distribution of burdens is a
relevant factor in the pursuit of justice in global health,
our mechanism implies that Namibia and Equatorial
Guinea should not have received external health re-
sources before Rwanda received what it needed to reach
the U$60 target. In this case Rwanda and all countries
which our mechanism places in a Rwanda-like situation
bore a disproportionate burden compared to Namibia
and Equatorial Guinea in attempting to cover the cost of
the global minimum level of health opportunities.
Further since the GMHE per capita for each country is
expected to cover the basic life-saving services it means
that citizens of Rwanda on one hand, and those of
Namibia and Equatorial Guinea on the other, had un-
equal access to these life-saving services. This illustrates
the kind of financing inequities that would be avoided if
all LMIC governments were required to allocate a spe-
cific optimal percentage of their annual (domestic) bud-
gets to health as we are proposing in respect to LICs.
Again, going by the figures provided by the 2013
African Health Financing Scorecard, it would have been
possible to save and redirect Global Funds totaling to at
least US$1.02 billion from just 12 of these (African)
countries. It should also be noted that this amount
would have been saved at the current health financing
levels (below 15 %) of these 12 countries. This implies
further that instead of asking the entire deficit for the
rest of LICs from the HICs, if a mechanism like this had
been followed in resource fundraising and disbursement,
the burden of HIC citizens could have been reduced
even further and would be even fairer. At this point it is
important to reiterate our disclaimer that the 15 %
which we have used in this illustration does not have
to be the actual size of LIC governments’ financing
obligation. Rather, it has been used to show how the
obligation of LIC governments to allocate a certain
uniform percentage of their domestically generated
budget resources to health along with mechanism we
have recommended have the capacity to lead to
equity in global health financing.
One objection to our argument could be that HICs
should not reduce their transfers to better-off poor coun-
tries which do not fulfill their obligations in order to be
able to increase their (HICs) transfers to poorer countries
that are in greater need. Rather, it may be recommended
in this objection that HICs should continue to support the
non-compliant better-off countries and at the same time
increase their transfers to poorer countries. However, this
objection ignores the fact this strategy rewards non-
compliance and, therefore, maintains inequities in inter-
national health financing. This is so because there is
evidence that for each dollar they receive in form of health
aid, some LIC governments reduce their health expend-
iture from their domestic resources [28, 32]. This is cor-
roborated by the evidence provided by the 2010 African
Financing Scorecard which shows that between the year
2000 and 2010, presumably due to the Global Fund and
GAVI funds effect, health financing as percentage of
domestic budget resources declined in 12 African coun-
tries [20]. It is important to note, however, that the decline
in domestic funding in the wake of increased external re-
sources could also be attributed to a number of macro-
economic goals especially IMF budget ceilings in LICs
[33]. However, IMF recommends ceilings for general
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social sector spending implying that if health is prioritised
within social sector budget allocations there will be no
need for extra fiscal space to accommodate an increase in
health budgets. But even if we work within an IMF im-
posed budget ceiling, this does not refute our general
claim that we should agree on a level of domestic health
spending, whatever that is, and use that level to work out
an equitable distribution of international transfers of aid.
By and large, the illustrations above show, by the spe-
cific examples of Uganda and Kenya, that even though
the burden borne by Uganda in financing health is
higher than that of Kenya, Uganda still has lower health
expenditure per capita from public funds than Kenya yet
both countries compete for the limited external health
resources without any assurance that Uganda will be
given priority to Kenya in external resource (per capita)
disbursements. This situation obtains between majority
of LMICs. This means that the size of Kenya’s claim on
international health resources is unfair in relation to that
of Uganda. In relation to HICs it is an unfair claim
because Kenya is doing less than it can by virtue of its
resource potential for health financing. To put it differ-
ently, when LICs allocate less than what might turn out to
be their optimal obligation and then claim the entire def-
icit from HICs they (LICs) end up unfairly imposing part
of their justified burden to citizens of both HICs and other
LMICs. The whole problem of lack of uniform and strin-
gent obligations of LIC governments in financing health
leads to a disproportionate sharing of the burden of finan-
cing global health leading to inequity in global health fi-
nancing. However, fulfilling LIC governments’ minimum
financial obligations for global health as proposed here
along with the mechanism we have recommended will
lead to equity in financing global health, in particular the
essential (minimum) health package for all individuals
globally; that is, financing equity between LMICs them-
selves, and between LMICs and HICs.
LICs’ financing obligation and intra-LIC equity
In the discussion above we have illustrated how the obli-
gation of LIC governments to allocate a certain uniform
minimum percentage of their domestic budget resources
to health can be effective as a mechanism for guiding
equitable health resource contributions and disburse-
ments globally, leading to inter-country equity. Now we
will illustrate how, in principle, this obligation leads
to equity in domestic health-financing and then sug-
gest additional obligations that would make such
equity a reality.
There is ample evidence that in nearly all LICs public
spending on health disproportionately benefits wealthier
citizens and also that health financing is very dispropor-
tionate in favor of the rich [7, 9, 10]. This is inequity in
health financing and it strongly determines how much
PHE as a financing mechanism is relied on in such
health systems. In some LMIC health systems PHE as a
percentage of Total Health Expenditure (THE) surpasses
the total contributed by both public and donor contribu-
tions to health spending.5 This situation obtains in the
financing of all health services even beyond the mini-
mum health packages. And given the very high income
inequalities in most LICs, the obvious consequence of
high dependency on PHE, especially out of pocket pay-
ments, is that poorer individuals carry a disproportionate
burden of financing the minimum health opportunities
and, at the same time, they have very unequal access to
these basic life-saving services.
In this illustration an important reiteration is that in
order to guarantee the targeted minimum of health op-
portunities to all individuals, the whole cost for this
minimum should be covered by public resources (con-
tributed by both HIC and LIC governments) so that
there will be no PHE for such services, at least at the
point of service delivery. With regards to the impact of
private health expenditure on health equity, the picture
among most LICs is grim. In Uganda, for instance, PHE
contributes about 50 % of THE, against 22 and 28 %
from domestic public and donor sources respectively
[28, 34]. For Rwanda in 2006 these figures were 28, 19
and 53 % respectively [35]; while for Kenya the same
figures were around 36.7, 28.8 and 34.5 % for private,
public and donor funding respectively for the financial
year 2009/10 [36]. Hence, with GINI co-efficiencies as
high as 50.8 % for Rwanda in 2011 [37]; 42.5 and 44.3
for Kenya in 2008 and Uganda in 2009 [38] respectively,
it means that the higher the PHE as percentage of na-
tional THE, the deeper the inequity in health financing.
And as long as these domestic inequities remain within
LICs, the consequence will remain – as Amouzou and
others have discovered – that “economic inequalities
with respect to health [U5MR] within developing coun-
tries contribute much more to the global health gap than
might appear to be the case at first glance; […]” [39]. In
this regard it is important to note that reducing health
disparities by economic status in LICs primarily requires
intra-country equity in health financing which reduces
the health costs of the poor through cross-subsidies and,
therefore, facilitates equal financial access to health
services for all. This will be possible if LICs fulfil their
minimum financing obligation.
In this paper we have been concerned with global
health equity defined as access by everyone to a mini-
mum level of health services. We recommend that
the whole cost of the global minimum health oppor-
tunities per capita for each country be covered by
pooled public resources (domestic plus external re-
sources). Once this has happened there will be no
PHE for this minimum, at least at the point of service
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delivery. Since our current concept of ‘global health
equity’ neither targets equality in access to the high-
est health opportunities globally, nor the same health
opportunities for LIC citizens as those of HIC citizens
but a rather significantly lower minimum of health
opportunities for all individuals, then as long as this
minimum is financed equitably there will have existed
global health equity as we have defined it.
Certainly there are other health costs other than those
at the point of service delivery such as transport costs,
time lost in caring for a family member, hours of work
lost by patients etc. But all the same the obligation we
have proposed will at least ensure equity in health finan-
cing at the point of service delivery which mostly hin-
ders access to health services within LICs. With due
regard to other sources of health inequities at a domestic
level, given that most of these inequities have a financial
implications we envisage that promoting and ensuring
equity in health financing within LICs is the first neces-
sary step in the right direction which should be followed
by other domestic measures. Such measures may include
ensuring efficiency, reducing geographical inequities,
equitable priority-setting between health interventions
(for diseases that mostly affect the poor versus those
that affect the rich, or by sex, age etc.) etc., all of which
will finally remedy the ills of inequity in global health
which arise from domestic contexts. Therefore, given
that an argument for this obligation presumes efficiency
and equitable mechanism in health resource allocation
among others and all of which are not true in most
LICs, these two along with other requirements would
constitute additional obligations for LIC governments as
we have argued elsewhere with respect to general obliga-
tions for global justice [40].
In summary, if all LICs are required to allocate a uni-
form optimal percentage of their domestic budgets to
health, fulfilling the resulting obligation by each country
and using the resulting deficits to determine the sizes of
HIC governments’ obligations to each LIC will have two
kinds of effects: the pragmatic effect and fairness effect.
From a pragmatic point of view, it will facilitate coordin-
ation in global health financing which is necessary to
avoid the current duplications arising from uncoordin-
ated international health resource transfers. It will en-
sure easy monitoring of international health resource
flows so that health resources are directed to where they
are mostly needed. Its fairness effect consists in ensuring
equitable health financing between all countries and
within countries for a certain minimum levels of health
opportunities for all individuals globally.
Potential controversies
One of the potential controversies likely to emerge in
implementing LIC obligations in health financing is how
to deal with cases where poor countries do not to fulfil
their obligations. The first issue is: what should be done
if LICs refuse [41] to fulfill their obligations? Should the
deficits resulting from this refusal be added to HIC obli-
gation for the sake guaranteeing the targeted minimum?
We believe that the answer should be no, for at least
two reasons. First, it would encourage complacency
among LIC governments if there is an automatic mech-
anism for covering deficits arising from refusal to fulfill
their obligations. There will be no motivation for LIC gov-
ernments to increase their domestic budget allocations to
health. Instead the motivation might be in the opposite
direction since the lesser the domestic resources they allo-
cate to health, the more they would get in international
health resource assistance. Rather, what needs to be
emphasised here is that the argument for this obligation is
based on the WHO premise that “Every country could
raise additional domestic funds for health or diversify their
funding sources if they wished to” (emphasis added), for
example, by giving higher priority to health in their do-
mestic budget allocations [15]. Following this premise we
hope that it is possible to persuade LIC governments to
do so even if it might require some minimum diplomatic
nudging. On the other hand, if failure to fulfil their obliga-
tions is due to genuine scarcity of resources (inability) –
say, due to deteriorating economy, unexpected epidemic
such as the recent Ebola or war situations etc. which limit
the capacity of countries to meet their obligations, then
whatever deficits arise from such situations would justly
be shared by all parties, or be responded to as a
humanitarian situation. The second reason is that
requiring HICs to cover deficits which arise out of LIC
governments’ refusal to fulfill their obligation constitutes
injustice against citizens of HICs and will, therefore, make
global equity in health financing impossible since HIC citi-
zens would have to contribute more than their propor-
tionate percentage.
The second controversial issue is whether HICs should
continue to fulfil their obligations of assistance even if
LIC governments refuse to fulfill theirs or, whether
international health resource transfers should be con-
strued as rewards to those LICs whose governments ful-
fill their obligations. We want to emphasise that
fulfilling obligations of HICs should not depend on
whether LIC governments fulfill their own obligation,
nor should international health funds to LICs be seen as
a reward for fulfilling their obligations. This is because
of at least three reasons: one, whenever they fulfil their
obligations, LIC governments are performing their duty
for which they do not have to be rewarded. Secondly,
international health resources are owed to citizens rather
than governments of LICs yet citizens in LICs have no
significant influence, if any at all, on budget allocations
of their countries like the Uganda example has revealed.
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Hence, even though governments in LICs refuse to fulfill
this obligation their citizens would retain their right to
international health resources. The third reason why
HICs should continue to fulfill their obligations to LIC
citizens even if LIC governments refuse to fulfil their
quota of obligations arises from the crucial importance
of health in protecting the sanctity of human life and its
dignity as well as the centrality of health in ensuring
other dimensions of human well-being. Hence, if HICs
refuse to fulfill their obligations to the citizens of LICs
in such circumstances they would be subjecting the citi-
zens of LICs to a ‘double-jeopardy’. For these reasons,
HIC obligations to citizens of LICs should remain mor-
ally binding even if LIC governments refuse or fail to
fulfil their financing obligations.
Summary
Achieving justice in global health requires different cat-
egories of obligations both by LICs, MICs and HICs. But
given that financial resources are pivotal in fulfilling
most of these obligations, without overlooking other po-
tential categories of obligations our view is that in order
to achieve global health equity it is important to start
with ensuring equity in financing global health. Having
realised that the current proposals and strategies to raise
sufficient resources to that effect largely ignore LIC gov-
ernments’ obligations, we have proposed, defended and
demonstrated the importance of obligations of LIC gov-
ernments, in particular their obligations regarding mini-
mum health financing. All LICs should allocate to health
a certain minimum percentage of their domestically gen-
erated annual budget resources as their quota of a global
obligation to guarantee to all individuals globally a cer-
tain minimum level of health opportunities. The mech-
anism we have recommended for determining each
country’s obligation in covering the cost of minimum
health opportunities along with the fulfilment of the
resulting obligations will ease coordination in global
health fundraising and resource disbursements. This will
ultimately lead to global equity in financing a certain
minimum level of health opportunities for all individuals
globally. However, this obligation can be exploited to
wrongly justify withholding international health re-
sources to very poor countries, especially to those which
are potential beneficiaries of redistribution but refuse to
fulfill their obligations. But given that the obligation to
contribute to international health resources is owed to
the citizens of LICs not governments per se; and given
the special nature and value of health in protecting the
sanctity of human life and its dignity among others, the
failure of governments of LICs to fulfill their obligations
should not exempt HIC governments from fulfilling
their share of obligations to LIC citizens.
Endnotes
1We recognise that there are many obligations that are
necessary to achieve equity in global health but for lack
of space we are limiting our current discussion to one of
them – equity in financing global health.
2Even though Ooms and Hammonds are primarily
concerned with HIC obligations to give health aid, their
analysis implies a belief that LIC governments ought to
bear obligations too.
3What we have done here is a hypothetical illustration.
We presume (and recommend) that the process of de-
termining the actual optimal financial obligation of
countries and their possible enforcement measures will
be evidence-based (especially regarding LICs’ resource
capacities), participatory and democratic involving all
concerned countries in respect of the principles of
national autonomy and sovereignty (and the possible
limits of these principles).
4Even though this argument is centred on obligations
of LICs, the mechanism suggested implies that this obli-
gation ought to be borne by all countries that rely on, or
need, external resources to reach the GMHE per capita.
5According to the 2012 WHO Global health expend-
iture atlas, in 2010, within the WHO African region
alone, in at least 13 countries PHE for health is more
than 50 % of THE with the highest at 88 % in Guinea.
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